This paper is concerned with the analysis of Event Trees where the branch point event causes are defined using Fault Tree structures. Attention is focussed on the non-trivial situation where there are dependencies amongst the branch point events. The dependencies are due to component failure events featuring in one or more of the fault trees. In these situations it is shown that analysis methods based on traditional fault tree analysis are both inaccurate and inefficient. A new approach using Binary Decision Diagrams is proposed which overcomes these deficiencies.
Introduction
Event Tree Analysis is a commonly applied technique used for identifying the consequences that can result following the occurrence of a potentially hazardous event. It was first applied in risk assessments for the nuclear industry but is now utilised by other industries such as chemical processing, offshore oil and gas production, and transportation. Quantification of the event tree diagram allows the frequency of each of the outcomes to be predicted. In a risk study the outcome event consequences, usually expressed in terms of fatalities, can be combined with the frequency of occurrence to produce an F-N curve to help assess the acceptability of the response to hazards. The potential hazardous trigger event is known as the initiator. Event trees are an inductive, or forward logic, technique which examines all possible responses to the initiating event progressing left to right across the page. The branch points on the tree structure usually represent the success, failure, or partial failure of different systems and subsystems which can respond to the initiating event. Fault Tree Analysis is a deductive analysis technique that can be used in conjunction with the event tree to identify the causes of the sub-system failures or branch events. Quantification of the fault tree provides the probability of passing along each of the event tree branches.
The methodology used to quantify event trees has changed very little since the conception of the technique back in the 1960's when it was successfully used in the WASH 1400 study (ref 1) . When the branch point events are independent of each other, quantification of the diagram is trivial and is simply achieved by finding the product of the frequency of the initiating event with the probabilities of passing along each branch leading to each outcome scenario. When there are dependencies between the branch events then the quantification of the probability of passing along different branch points is more complex. It is performed by quantifying a fault tree whose top event is defined as combinations of occurrence and non-occurrence of the branch point events that have in turn been developed with fault tree structures. Therefore there is a very heavy dependence on the efficiency and accuracy of the fault tree analysis technique. Fault Tree Analysis is frequently used in its own right for safety system assessments and the majority of computer codes used to perform these analyses are based on the Kinetic Tree Theory of Vesely formulated in 1970 (ref 2) . This theory utilises approximations. Recent work at Loughborough University (refs 3-5), Bordeaux University (refs 6-8) and Virginia University (refs 9-10) has produced a new assessment technique based on a Binary Decision Diagram or BDD formulation of the system failure logic. This approach has been shown to have advantages in terms of both efficiency and accuracy over the conventional Kinetic Tree Theory. Since top event probabilities can be derived exactly and without the need to evaluate the minimal cut sets or prime implicants as intermediate results this has major implications for improving the accuracy and efficiency of event tree analysis. This paper demonstrates the traditional event tree analysis technique and compares this to a BDD based approach. The inadequacies of the original approach are demonstrated for very simple system. It is shown that these deficiencies are overcome when a BDD based approach is used. Figure 1 shows a very simple event tree structure for an example safety system. The initiating event is the release of gas on an offshore platform. The branch points then consider the success (W) and failure (F) of the gas detection system, isolation valve sub-systems A and B, and the blowdown valve sub-system in turn. The outcomes determined by the end point of each event tree branch identifies a different consequence following the initiating event. Fault trees can be constructed to develop the causes of each of these sub-system failures. If the systems fail independently then the event tree quantification is the relatively simple task of multiplying the probabilities of passing along each branch point on any path through the diagram by the initiating event frequency. System failure probabilities P f can be evaluated by quantifying the relevant fault tree. 1-P f then gives the likelihood of passing along the system success branch. 'Strong' dependencies when P(A|B) = 1 or P(A|B) = 0 for system A event following the system B event can also be incorporated in this approach. As can be see from figure 1 if the gas detection system fails then each of the other systems will not be activated and so their availability is irrelevant, the consequence in this sequence already determined. This is represented by the line from the branch representing gas detection system failure going completely across the diagram indicating that this event alone determines the outcome.
Independent Event Trees

Dependencies in Event Trees
The procedure to analyse Event Trees when there are 'weak' dependencies utilises the fault tree analysis technique much more heavily. 'Weak' dependencies occur when basic events representing component failures appear in more than one of the fault trees which develop the branch point causes. In these circumstances the fault trees representing the relevant system working and failed states need to be combined as inputs to an AND gate whose output now determines the causes of a higher level 'complex' event. Boolean reduction of the combined fault tree structure will produce the combinations of basic events which will cause the complex system event taking account of the dependency. Since some of the sub-system events which make up the complex event will represent the system success, the resulting fault tree structure will be non-coherent. The analysis of non-coherent fault trees using the tradition analysis technique of Kinetic Tree Theory relies heavily on approximation as detailed below and is at times both inaccurate and inefficient. The newly developed Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) approach can offer advantages in both efficiency and accuracy which would become especially important when analysing very large event trees such as those produced in the nuclear industry.
To demonstrate the advantages a BDD approach will have over the conventional Fault Tree Analysis method when utilised to assess an event tree, both techniques will be discussed in relation to the simple event tree illustrated in Figure 2 . There are only two sub-systems (S1 and S2) which respond to the initiating event (I).
Figure 2 Simple Event Tree Structure
The fault trees representing the failure of sub-systems S1 and S2 are shown in figures 3a and 3b respectively. Note that since the basic events A and D occur in both fault trees there is a 'weak' dependence between the sub-system failure events. Due to the 'weak' dependencies the four outcomes which can occur in response to the initiating event are developed as fault trees with top event structures shown in figure 4 . The introduction of the NOT gates in three of these structures produces non-coherent trees. The efficiency and accuracy of the event tree quantification is then dependent upon the efficiency and accuracy of the fault tree analysis technique for non-coherent fault trees. (1)
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The dual formulations of the fault trees representing failure of systems S1 and S2 (figs 3a and 3b) are shown in figure 5a and 5b respectively. 
Qualitative Fault Tree Analysis
When NOT logic is introduced to a fault tree structure it no longer has a non-decreasing structure function and it is therefore non-coherent. Boolean reduction, of the logic function representing the top event of a coherent fault tree, to a sum-of-products or disjunctive normal form identifies the minimal cut sets. When the fault tree is non-coherent the equivalent logic expression for the top event produces the PRIME IMPLICANTS.
Minimal Cut Set is a combination of component failure events which are necessary and sufficient to cause the top event.
Prime Implicant is a combination of basic events (success or failure) which is both necessary and sufficient to cause the top event.
When the tree structure is coherent the Boolean reduction process results in minimal cut sets. Manipulating the Boolean expression for a coherent fault tree requires the use of the following Boolean Laws:
And absorption
For non-coherent fault trees the following laws relating to complemented events are also used.
From the fault trees representing the causes of the two safety system failures (figs 3a and 3b) in the simple event tree, the following Boolean expressions are derived for the top event.
From the fault trees representing system success (figure 5a and 5b) the top event causes are derived from: 
Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis
Once the top event causes ( ) C i are determined i.e. the minimal cut sets or Prime Implicants, then the top event probability P(T) can be found by evaluating the inclusion-exclusion expansion.
When the C i are minimal cut sets this series expression is frequency approximated by truncating the expansion after the first one or two terms or using an alternative approximation such as the minimal cut set upper bound:
For coherent fault trees the truncation of the expansion given in equation (12) is justified as the terms which account for the simultaneous occurrence of higher order failure combinations have a rapidly diminishing numerical contribution to the top event probability. If the tree is noncoherent and C i are prime implicants then these approximations may not be valid and many terms in the series expansion may need to be calculated to gain the required accuracy. For large fault trees it would be beyond the capability of modern day computers to evaluate the full expansion in any reasonable time. In order to quantify the probability the prime implicants are frequently reduced to their coherent approximations by assuming any working states for the components in the expression are set to TRUE. On the basis that P(component works) ≈ 1, the resulting approximations to the minimal cut sets are then minimised and approximations such as equation (13) used.
Evaluating the causes of the Event Tree Outcomes
Identifying the causes of each of the event tree outcomes where the fault trees have "weak" dependencies is equivalent to reducing the Boolean expressions for the fault trees illustrated in figure 4 to disjunctive normal form. 
Quantifying the Frequency of the Event Tree Outcomes
The minimal cut sets or prime implicants evaluated during the qualitative analysis of the fault tree are used along with the probability of each basic event to evaluate the frequency λ i of each event tree outcome. For exact results equation 12 is used to determine the probability of the particular responses for systems S1 and S2. This probability is then multiplied by the initiating event frequency to determine the frequency of each event tree outcome. To provide a numerical comparison of results, and the effects of the approximations it is assumed that each component failure probability is 0.1 and the initiating event frequency is 1.0/year. 
As this is a very small simple example the exact calculations can be performed. When the minimal cut sets or prime implicants are several thousand, perhaps hundreds of thousands, in number these calculations cannot be performed. For a coherent fault tree the inclusion-exclusion (eq 12) converges and truncation after the first or second term usually yields a result of acceptable accuracy. Alternatively the Minimum Cut Set Upper bound (eq 13) is a better approximation (exact when the minimal cut sets are independent).
For non-coherent fault trees the convergence of the inclusion-exclusion expansion can be very slow and a large number of terms need to be evaluated. For large fault trees this is not possible. An alternative method (frequently employed in commercial packages) is to use the coherent approximation. For the simple example this gives: 
Binary Decision Diagrams
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) provide an alternative logic form to the fault tree structure to express the system failure causes. The BDD encodes a Shannon form of the structure function. As a result, the exact system failure probability can be deduced without the need to resort to any approximations. The BDD structure has the additional advantage that its quantification does not require the minimal cut sets/prime implicants to be determined as an intermediate stage.
Improvements in both accuracy and efficiency are gained by employing a BDD approach. However, nothing comes without cost and for the BDD the cost is the effort expended converting from a fault tree structure to the BDD. Previous work carried out investigating the relative efficiency of the conventional fault tree and BDD approaches has shown that orders of magnitude reduction in computer processing time for large fault trees can be achieved. This improvement would be expected to be even more significant for non-coherent fault trees which tend to produce a vast number of system failure modes which include component success states (prime implicants).
The BDD structure for the fault tree in figure 3a is illustrated in figure 6a . BDD construction requires the basic events to be ordered. For this example the order is taken as A<B<C<D. The diagram features a root vertex placed at the top of the tree structure. Each vertex or node represents a basic event from the fault tree and has two paths which leave the node, a 1 branch and a 0 branch which indicate the occurrence (failure) and non-occurrence of the basic event respectively. Paths through the BDD terminate at one of two types of terminal node, labelled 1 and 0. Paths which lead to a terminal 1 node specify the conditions for the fault tree top event to occur (i.e. structure function φ( ) x = 1). Listing just the failure events on such a path is equivalent to producing the cut sets for the fault tree. Unless the basic event ordering selected has produced a minimal form BDD these will have to be processed to remove redundant cut sets and produce the minimal cut sets. There is a procedure developed to transform the BDD to encode only minimal cut sets (ref 7) . Whilst this is an important source of information to the analyst it is not required to evaluate the event tree outcome frequencies. Conversely paths terminating in a 0 terminal node represent the top event non-occurrence. Due to the binary branching each path in the BDD is mutually exclusive and so the probability of system failure is obtained by simply summing the probability of each disjoint path leading to a terminal one node. The probability of each disjoint path is the likelihood of the combination of the basic events (success and failure) represented by the path.
The disjoint failure paths for the BDD shown in figure 6 along with their probabilities are given below:
Disjoint Path Probability Probability if
The system (Top Event) failure probability is therefore 0.1171 (summing disjoint path probabilities)
Dual formulation using the BDD
One of the features of the BDD structure is the ease with which the dual can be formulated. The primary BDD represents the structure function φ( )
The dual BDD represents TA and created by changing the terminal 1's to terminal 0's and viceversa. Note in this formulation of the dual the nodes on the BDD still represent component failure states. Applying these rules to the BDD illustrated in figure 6a gives the dual shown in figure 6b .
The path through the dual BDD to a terminal 1 which includes each node passed through on the 0 branch (working components) represents the Path Sets of the fault tree.
A path set is a list of working components which if they occur at the same time result in the system working. Therefore the path sets for the BDD shown in figure 6b are:
BCD AD
In this case these path sets are also minimal and agree with those produced by the conventional analysis method (eq 10). The transformation between primal and dual is very efficient.
Event Tree Outcomes
Using the BDD method to analyse the outcomes of the Event Tree shown in figure 2 requires the BDD and dual formulation for the fault trees given in figures 3a and 3b. Figures 6a and 6b contain the BDD and dual BDD (DBDD) for the figure 3a Fault tree. For the figure 3b fault tree, the equivalent BDD is illustrated in figure 7a and its dual BDD in figure 7b . Note the Variable ordering A<D<E<F<G has been assumed. 
Cut Sets
Event Tree Analysis Algorithm
The calculations performed in the previous section have shown that using a BDD structure to evaluate the likelihood of event tree outcomes when 'weak' dependencies exist is both accurate (exact) and efficient. It is only desirable to construct the combined BDD's when such dependencies are encountered. For independent sections it is simply the product of the probabilities that is required. An algorithm is given below which quantifies a general event tree structure with both 'weak' and ' strong' dependencies. It is assumed that the event tree structure is drawn to account for the 'strong' dependencies. The event tree has an initiating event with frequency λ I resulting in outcome events O i , i=1,--,n, each with associated consequence c i . Each path through the diagram leading to an outcome considers the functionality or failure of m sub-systems S j , j=1,---,m. Fault trees have been constructed to represent the causality of each of the sub-system failures. Component failure events are repeated in k of the m fault trees providing k 'weakly' dependent and m-k independent fault tree structures.
1.
Scan each of the S j sub-system fault trees. If the fault tree is independent of all other fault trees enter its label j in set I. If the fault tree has at least one basic event in common with another fault tree place its label j in set W.
2.
Convert all of the S j sub-system fault trees to their Binary Decision Diagram, BDD j .
3.
For all m-k entries in set I, use the relevant BDD to evaluate the sub-system failure probability Q j , j ∈ I. 4.
For each of the k entries in set W formulate and store the Dual Binary Decision Diagram DBDD j , j ∈W.
5.
Set Q I =1.0 a) Over each path leading to outcome O i . Consider each branch point on the path from the initiating event.
If (the branch point label j ∈ I) THEN If (branch point represents sub-system functionality)THEN Q I =Q I *(1-Q j ) ELSE (branch point represents sub-system failure) Q I =Q I *Q j ENDIF ELSE (branch point label j ∈W) THEN If (branch point represents sub-system functionality) THEN place j in the dual set D ELSE (branch point represents sub-system failure) place j in the primal set P ENDIF ENDIF b)
Construct the overall dependency BDD for event T i where:
Calculate the probability of event T i , Q T i using the newly formed BDD. 12. Example -Leak detection system on an offshore structure As an example application of the analysis procedure proposed, consider the gas leak system event tree shown in figure 1 . It is a simplified system taken from an offshore oil and gas production platform. In the event of a loss of containment on the gas section the detection system should function to identify the event occurrence. The isolation and blowdown systems are then triggered, the isolation system closes valves A and B to ensure the potential escape inventory is limited.
Blowdown valves then open to de-pressurise the sections safely by allowing the gas to go to the flare. Simplified fault trees showing the causes of failure of the gas detection, isolation and blowdown systems are shown in figure 9 . The fault trees feature the important characteristics of a full study and can be used to demonstrate the validity of the method for a complete analysis. As indicated on the event tree, the isolation and blowdown system are 'strongly' dependent on the gas detection system. It can also be seen that there is a 'weak' dependency, failure of the relay contacts RC1, common to three of the fault trees, two other such dependencies representing solenoid failures, are common to the isolation valve fault trees. To obtain realistic orders of magnitude for the failure probabilities in the trees each basic event is assigned an availability of 95%. Applying the algorithm presented in section 11 places the detection system into set I and the remaining systems into set W. The complications arise considering the outcome probabilities of the routes through the event tree which have dependencies (outcomes 1-8 in figure 2 ). Table 1 shows the results obtained using the algorithm for these event probabilities (in column 3). Having considered the dependencies the final frequency of occurrence for each of outcome events 1-8 are obtained by multiplying the probabilities given in table 1 by the probability that the detection system works, 5.569x10 -2 , and the initiating event frequency. To compare with conventional techniques an analysis using coherent approximations has been performed and the results presented in column 5 of table 1, the minimal cut sets are listed in column 4. It can be seen that the error in the approach ranges from 10.7% to 23.4% for the noncoherent outcomes.
Figure 9 Gas leak system fault trees
13. Conclusions 1. Conventional approaches to modelling dependencies in event tree analysis using coherent approximations are shown to be inaccurate. The inaccuracies are not consistent across the outcome events. If frequency predictions calculated in this way are then used in a risk assessment to construct the F-N curve then the relative risks would be distorted and could lead to resources being used inappropriately to reduce the overall risk. 2. An alternative approach is proposed which makes use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD's) to perform the event tree analysis. Manipulation of BDD's is both efficient and accurate. The application of this method means that any error in the analysis can be attributed to the failure model used to represent the system or uncertainty in the failure/repair data. It can not be attributed to the calculation procedure. 
